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How a human observer perceives duration depends on the amount of events
taking place during the timed interval, but also on psychological dimensions, such
as emotional-wellbeing, mindfulness, impulsivity, and rumination. Here we aimed at
exploring these influences on duration estimation and passage of time judgments. One
hundred and seventeen healthy individuals filled out mindfulness (FFMQ), impulsivity
(BIS-11), rumination (RRS), and depression (BDI-sf) questionnaires. Participants also
conducted verbal estimation and production tasks in the multiple seconds range. During
these timing tasks, subjects were asked to read digits aloud that were presented on a
computer screen. Each condition of the timing tasks differed in terms of the interval
between the presentation of the digits, i.e., either short (4-s) or long (16-s). Our findings
suggest that long empty intervals (16-s) are associated with a relative underestimation
of duration, and to a feeling that the time passes slowly, a seemingly paradoxical
result. Also, regarding more mindful individuals, such a dissociation between duration
estimation and passage of time judgments was found, but only when empty intervals
were short (4-s). Relatively speaking, more mindful subjects showed an increased
overestimation of durations, but felt that time passed more quickly. These results provide
further evidence for the dissociation between duration estimation and the feeling of the
passage of time. We discuss these results in terms of an alerting effect when empty
intervals are short and events are more numerous, which could mediate the effect of
dispositional mindfulness.
Keywords: time perception, dispositional mindfulness, duration estimation, passage of time, duration production
INTRODUCTION
The subjective experience of duration is modulated by a number of contextual and individual
factors independent of actual physical time. That is, the same time interval is experienced
differently across individuals. Thus, time perception is involved in how one may feel according
to the event taking place, and may play a crucial role in how one makes decisions in everyday life.
For instance, if an individual overestimates the duration of a specific situation encountered in the
past, during which time seemed to ‘drag,’ he might feel inclined to avoid it. Subjective time thereby
involves at least two aspects – the judgment of the passage of time (i.e., how fast the time seems to
pass) and the estimation of duration (i.e., how long an event seemed to have lasted), experiences
which can vary independently of each other (Wearden et al., 2014). Personality traits, the nature
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of an event (as more or less attention capturing), and momentary
physiological and psychological states are all involved in duration
judgments. Here we designed a study in order to evaluate
the relationship between dispositional mindfulness in a healthy
population and different aspects of the experience of time in the
multiple seconds range, such as the amount of events presented
during the interval, and the kind of duration judgment required
in the task – regarding the judgment of the passage of time and
the estimation of duration.
Several factors should be controlled for when assessing
empirically the experience of time. Findings suggest that the
amount and the kind of events presented during an interval
affect how alerting the event is judged to be, and thus how
fast the passage of time and duration are estimated (Droit-Volet
and Meck, 2007; Zakay, 2014). Essentially, the instructions given
to participants before the actual task influence the judgment
of time. When subjects are unaware that they are going to be
asked questions about time (i.e., retrospective timing after the
event or an interval has elapsed), they have to rely on memory
retrieval. The more events and contextual changes are encoded
and stored in memory the longer the duration is judged to be
(Zakay and Block, 2004; Zakay, 2014). In contrast, when subjects
are informed that the task they are going to perform is related
to time (i.e., prospective timing), duration is estimated based
on the attentional resources allocated to the task, i.e., duration
estimation (rather than to the events). The more resources
are allocated for timing, the longer the prospective duration
judgment (Brown, 1997; Zakay and Block, 2004).
Multiple studies have found results consistent with this model
(e.g., Block and Zakay, 1997; Wittmann and Paulus, 2008). Yet
discordant results have also been reported in the literature, which
seem to be related to the type, duration and complexity of
information processed during the timed intervals (Wearden et al.,
2014). Wearden (2008) included passage of time judgments in
his study and found that, in a retrospective timing task, high
information processing load (i.e., semantic vs. visual processing
of words) was associated with a slowing of the passage of time
when durations were relatively short (i.e., 18 s), and a speeding
of the passage of time when durations were long (i.e., 72 s).
However, there was no effect of the experimental manipulations
on duration estimation. This dissociation between passage of
time and duration judgments (see also Watt, 1991) suggests that
passage of time judgments are particularly sensitive to the content
of the events timed and how one subjectively reacts to this content
(Wearden et al., 2014). All in all, these results first of all imply
that the amount and the kind of events should be controlled
for, and second, that the way subjects react to the amount
of information during an interval has to be considered: the
information may draw their attention or bore them depending
on their disposition. Therefore, the experience of duration might
be affected by subjective dimensions, such as mindfulness as a
trait, and personality traits like impulsivity, or the tendency to
ruminate.
Mindfulness affects the way individuals attend to the
environment, regardless of the kind of events taking place.
Mindfulness has been defined as intentionally focusing one’s
attention on experiences occurring in the present moment in a
non-judgmental way, i.e., attending to and accepting events as
they occur (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). It is a multi-faceted concept that
can be either conceptualized as a personality trait, or as a skill
that can be trained. People who are more mindful are more able
to allocate attention to each present moment, regardless of the
information processing load. This would extend even to periods
without specific events, during which more mindful subjects
tend to attend to each moment in an accepting way. Besides
effects on attention, mindfulness may also affect time perception
(Wittmann and Schmidt, 2014). One of the main aspects that
link mindfulness to time perception is its focus on moment-
to-moment awareness. Several studies suggest that there is a
relationship between mindfulness training and the experience
of duration (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2012; Kramer et al., 2013;
Sucala and David, 2013; Droit-Volet et al., 2015; Wittmann
et al., 2015) but there is only few data regarding the impact
of mindfulness as a personality trait. In one study, Wittmann
et al. (2014) examined the relationship between dispositional
mindfulness, evaluated via two self-report questionnaires (FMI,
Walach et al., 2006; CHIME, Bergomi et al., 2013) and the
performance on prospective timing tasks. The authors found a
relationship between elevated levels of self-rated mindfulness,
particularly the ‘acceptance’ subscale of the FMI, and increased
time discrimination accuracy in the milliseconds and seconds
range. However, this study did not assess the judgment of
the passage of time, and the impact of the nature of the
task (e.g., with more or less events) on the experience of
duration.
There are also other personality traits that might affect
duration judgments. Conceptually, impulsivity is on the other
end of a spectrum with trait mindfulness and self-control,
and several studies (e.g., Peters et al., 2011; Wittmann et al.,
2014, 2015) found an inverse relationship between dispositional
mindfulness and impulsivity. Furthermore, like mindfulness,
time perception seems to be related to impulsive behavior.
For example, when making choices between smaller immediate
versus larger delayed outcomes, impulsive individuals tend to
prefer the smaller immediate outcome more often as compared
to more self-controlled participants, who choose more often the
larger delayed outcomes (e.g., Baumann and Odum, 2012). This
choice bias in impulsive individuals has been found to be related
to an overestimation of long durations (Wittmann and Paulus,
2008; Baumann and Odum, 2012). Moreover, in patients with
psychiatric conditions characterized by an increased impulsivity,
such as borderline personality disorder, substance-use disorder,
and ADHD, an overestimation and under-production of intervals
ranging from seconds to minutes has been found consistently
(e.g., Barkley et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2002; Berlin and Rolls,
2004; Berlin et al., 2004; Wittmann et al., 2007). However, to
our knowledge, these studies did not partial out the effect of
facets of impulsivity on time perception. Several factor analytic
studies suggest indeed that, like mindfulness, impulsivity is a
multi-faceted concept (e.g., Stanford et al., 2009), including a
(i) cognitive subtrait, involved in making cognitive decisions,
a (ii) motor subtrait, involved in acting without thinking,
and a (iii) non-planning subtrait, characterized as a present-
orientation or a lack of “futuring” (Patton et al., 1995; Stanford
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et al., 2009). The non-planning subtrait seems to be particularly
related to duration judgments, and can be expected to predict
performance in timing tasks. On the other hand, the motor
subtrait might be selectively involved in duration production.
In addition, none of the previous studies with highly impulsive
individuals included judgments of the passage of time nor did
they partial out the specific contribution of different personality
traits (mindfulness, impulsivity or rumination) on estimation of
duration.
Here we aimed at taking into account the two personality
traits of mindfulness and impulsivity which have been associated
with the experience of time. In addition, we evaluated the
contribution of the tendency to ruminate as well as current
depressive symptoms, because they might represent confounding
factors (Thönes and Oberfeld, 2015). Rumination has been
defined as a repetitive and analytical pattern of thinking found
to be a vulnerability trait for the development of depression
(Aldao et al., 2010). According to the Response Styles Theory
(RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987), rumination includes both self-
reflection, considered to be an adaptive form of rumination,
and brooding, i.e., a repetitive focus on one’s negative emotions,
considered to be maladaptive (Treynor et al., 2003). Maladaptive
rumination is often accompanied by low mood, and a feeling
that time is slowed down (e.g., Bschor et al., 2004; Boschloo
et al., 2013; Marchetti et al., 2014). Conceptually, maladaptive
rumination has been positively associated with impulsivity on
the one hand, and negatively associated with mindfulness on
the other hand (e.g., Paul et al., 2013; Marchetti et al., 2014;
Selby et al., 2014; Crawley, 2015). Unlike brooding, self-reflection
might be associated with mind-wandering and positive mood
(Marchetti et al., 2014). Both aspects of rumination may thus
have a distinct impact on time perception. This suggests that
both facets associated with rumination tendency and current
depressive mood should be taken into account when evaluating
the specific contribution of mindfulness-proneness to duration
judgments.
In our study, all subjects were tested in several experimental
conditions, aimed at manipulating the amount of secondary-
task events during duration judgments. The amount of events
can have two opposite effects, as described above: it can divert
attention from encoding duration, or it can lead subjects to
feel less bored and be more attentive. To contrast these two
possibilities, we manipulated the duration of empty intervals (4
vs. 16 s) between secondary-task events in a series of prospective
tasks of duration estimation (32-s and 128-s duration) and
duration production (30-s and 60-s duration). In addition to the
duration judgments, we asked subjects to evaluate the subjective
speed of the passage of time after the verbal estimation task. If
subjects allocate more attention to time when empty intervals are
long, then we should find a relative overestimation of durations
for 16-s empty intervals. If the feeling of the passage of time
is directly derived from duration estimation, an overestimation
of duration should be associated with the feeling that time
passes slowly. The feeling of the passage of time might be
dissociated from duration estimation, however, (Wearden et al.,
2014; Wearden, 2015). For example, long empty intervals may
not affect attention allocation, but may be essentially boring.
Reversely, short empty intervals may have an alerting effect. In
that case, long empty intervals might lead subjects to evaluate
the passage of time as being slower compared to shorter ones.
Self-report questionnaires were used in order to evaluate the
relationship between performance in these different conditions
and personality traits. Our study design should be able to partial
out the specific impact of mindfulness-proneness on duration
evaluation and/or on the feeling of the passage of time, and
to check whether such effects are independent or not from
impulsivity, rumination tendency, and current mood.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
For this cross-sectional study design, 117 healthy individuals aged
17–56 years (M = 26, SD = 7.7) were recruited among the staff
and students at the University Hospital of Strasbourg. Women
constituted 59% of the sample. Out of the 117 participants,
78 were university students, mostly in psychology and medical
schools. It is to be noted that the results reported below were
similar when only the university students were included in
the analyses. Participants provided informed consent prior to
inclusion in the study in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Materials and Procedures
Timing Tasks
Equipment and stimuli
Time estimation and production tasks were generated via
the Microsoft PowerPoint software (Wittmann et al., 2015).
The presentation was displayed on a 17′ LCD color monitor.
Participants viewed the display from a distance of 60 cm.
During the timing tasks, digits were displayed, white on a black
background, and were well-contrasted. Digits were 2.4◦ of visual
angle high (1 cm corresponds to 1◦ of visual angle at a distance of
57 cm). Digits were presented on the center of the screen inside a
red-lined square that measured 4.8◦ of visual angle and they were
displayed for the duration of 1 s. The keyboard was used when
motor responses were required. Four verbal estimation tasks,
followed by a subjective judgment of the passage of time, were
administered. Following the estimation tasks, four production
tasks were administered.
Procedure for the verbal estimation and judgment of the
passage of time tasks
Participants were asked to read aloud the numbers that were
presented on the center of the computer screen, and estimate the
duration of the task when it was over. The secondary number
reading task was meant to prevent counting, and we additionally
asked subjects to avoid counting while performing the task.
Following the verbal estimation of the duration, subjects were
asked to complete a visual analog scale (VAS), ranging from 1
(time passed very fast) to 10 (time passed very slowly), in order to
evaluate their subjective perception of the passage of time during
the estimation task. The conditions of the verbal estimation task
differed in terms of their total duration (32 s vs. 128 s), as well
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as the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the digits that
were presented and read aloud (mean= 4 s vs. mean= 16 s). The
four conditions were presented in random order. In the 4-s SOA
conditions, SOA actually ranged from 3 s to 5 s (mean= 4 s), and
interval durations were presented in a random manner, in order
to avoid anticipation. Likewise, in the 16-sec SOA conditions,
SOA actually ranged from 13 to 19 s (mean = 16 s), and interval
durations were presented in a random manner.
Procedure for the production tasks
Participants were asked to read aloud the numbers that were
presented on the center of the screen, and press the “escape”
button on the computer keyboard when 30 s (4 s vs. 16 s SOA
between numbers) or 60 s (4 s vs. 16 s SOA between numbers) had
passed. Like the estimation tasks, the secondary number reading
task was meant to prevent counting, and we additionally asked
subjects to avoid counting while performing the task. The actual
time lapse produced by the participants was recorded via a timer.
Like the estimation tasks, production tasks differed in terms of
the duration expected (30 vs. 60 s), and the SOA between the
digits that were presented (mean = 4 s vs. mean = 16 s). The
four conditions were presented in a random order.
Self-Report Questionnaires
Participants filled-out four self-report questionnaires in-
between verbal estimation and production task conditions.
Questionnaires were administered in a fixed order.
Mindfulness
The Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al.,
2008) is a 39-item self-report questionnaire which contains items
rated on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (never or rarely
true) to 5 (very often or always true). Mindfulness is measured
on the basis of a five-dimensional structure with the factor
‘observing’ referring to the awareness of internal and external
experiences; the factor ‘describing’ consisting of items related
to ‘labeling internal experiences with words’; the ‘acting with
awareness’ factor referring to the attention one pays to present
activities; the ‘non-judgment of inner experiences’ factor relating
to ‘the tendency to take a non-evaluative stance toward thoughts
and feelings’; and the ‘non-reactivity to inner experience’ factor
referring to the tendency to allow ‘thoughts and feelings to come
and go.’ This questionnaire has good psychometric properties,
and was constructed based on the items of five other mindfulness
questionnaires. Indeed, Cronbach’s alpha for all of the five factors
of the FFMQ are higher than 0.75, suggesting good internal
consistency (Heeren et al., 2011). Because of its multifaceted
nature, the FFMQ is supposed to reliably measure the complex
construct of mindfulness (Sauer and Baer, 2010). The version of
the scale we used has been validated in French (Heeren et al.,
2011).
Impulsivity
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995)
is a 30-item self-report questionnaire with items rated on a
4-point scale ranging from 1 (rarely) to 4 (almost always).
Items are grouped into three subscales corresponding to non-
planning impulsivity (“I plan tasks carefully”), motor impulsivity
(“I do things without thinking”), and cognitive impulsivity (“I
concentrate easily”). Patton et al. (1995) reported an Alpha
coefficient for the BIS total score of 0.82, suggesting an overall
good internal consistency. The French version of the scale has
been validated (Baylé et al., 2000).
Rumination
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema and
Morrow, 1991; Treynor et al., 2003) is a 22-item self-report
questionnaire which evaluates two aspects of trait-rumination:
‘Brooding’ (five items) taps passive rumination on negative mood
and is considered to be maladaptive whereas ‘reflection’ (five
items) refers to active efforts to understand one’s negative feelings,
and is considered to be adaptive. A total score is obtained via
the sum of the 22 items. Items are rated on a scale of 1 (“almost
never”) to 4 (“almost always”). In their psychometric analysis of
the reflection and brooding subscales of the RRS, Treynor et al.
(2003) found an Alpha coefficient of 0.72 and 0.77, respectively.
The French version of the scale has been validated (Jermann et al.,
2010).
Mood
The Beck Depression Inventory short-form (BDI-sf; Beck and
Beamesderfer, 1974) is a 13-item self-report scale that measures
the severity of depressive symptoms. Items are rated on a scale
ranging from 0 (the symptom is absent) to 3 (maximum severity).
This scale has been validated in French (Bourque and Beaudette,
1982).
RESULTS
Analyses were undertaken using the Statistica R© software. For
each one of the three timing tasks – verbal estimation, judgment
of the passage of time, and production –, we conducted a repeated
measures ANOVA with two within-subject factors, task duration
(32 vs. 128 s) and SOA between successive numbers (4 s vs. 16 s).
Verbal Estimation, Judgment of the
Passage of Time, and Temporal
Production
Overall, participants on average overestimated durations in both
the 32-s and the 128-s duration conditions (mean = 39.41 s
SD = 24.01 and mean = 144.23 s, SD = 78.08, respectively).
In the verbal estimation tasks, there was no significant main
effect of the SOA, F(1,116) = 3.06, p = 0.08, η2 = 0.026, but
duration had a significant effect, F(1,116) = 333.48, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.742 (cf. Supplementary Material for means and standard
errors across conditions in this task). As expected, estimations
were longer when the actual durations were longer (128 s) as
compared to when they were shorter (32 s). In the judgment of
the flow of time, there was a significant main effect of both the
SOA and duration, F(1,116) = 66.76, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.366, and
F(1,116)= 161.33, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.582, respectively. Regardless
of the duration condition, subjects judged the time to pass faster
when the SOA was short (4 s), compared to when it was long (16 s;
cf. Figure 1 and Supplementary Material for means and standard
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FIGURE 1 | Effect of the SOA between numbers on the judgment of the passage of time (VAS).
errors across conditions in this task). Also, as expected, subjects
judged the time to pass faster when the actual duration was short
(32 sec), compared to when it was long (128 s).
In the production tasks, on average, subjects overproduced
durations in both the 30-s and the 60-s duration conditions
(mean = 35.20, SD = 13.64, and mean = 67.85 and SD = 26.07,
respectively). Moreover, there were significant main effects of
both the SOA and the duration on the production performance,
F(1,116) = 9.11, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.072, and F(1,116) = 466.35,
p < 0.001,η2 = 0.800, respectively. As expected, subjects
produced longer intervals when the duration was long (60 s),
compared to when it was short (30 s). More interestingly, subjects
overproduced more when the SOA was long (16 s) compared to
when it was short (4 s), regardless of the task duration. There
was a significant duration X SOA interaction, F(1,116) = 6.24,
p = 0.01, η2 = 0.052. Post hoc Tukey test analyses revealed that
only in the 60-s duration condition SOA had a significant effect
on performance, with subjects overproducing more when the
SOA was long (16 s) compared to when it was short (4 s; cf.
Figure 2 and Supplementary Material for means and standard
errors across conditions in this task).
Correlation Analyses between
Psychological Dimensions
Regarding the correlation results reported below, in addition
to presenting significance levels of p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, we
applied a rigorous method of alpha level adjustment for multiple
comparisons, the false discovery rate (FDR) method. FDR is a
multiple comparisons correction, developed by Benjamini and
Hochberg (1995), where we set the initial p-value to 0.05.
We conducted a first order correlation analyses in order to
assess the relationship between the psychological dimensions
evaluated via the questionnaires, namely trait-mindfulness,
current mood, trait-impulsivity, and trait-rumination. Our aim
was to check whether we could replicate the typically found
relationships between mindfulness, impulsivity, rumination,
and mood. Hence, we report here the correlations between
different facets of mindfulness and different facets of these
psychological dimensions. Overall, our results suggest that
subjects who are more mindful, are also less impulsive (Table 1),
ruminate less (Table 2), and report less depressive mood
(Table 3). There is only one correlation going against those
associations, i.e., a positive relationship between one subscale
of the FFMQ, ‘observing’ and the subscales as well as the total
score on the RRS. These correlations suggest that subjects, who
observe more their inner experiences, are also more prone to
rumination.
Regression Analyses
The regressions between the psychological dimensions suggest
that several aspects of personality and mood are related to
dispositional mindfulness. Any correlation between performance
and the FFMQ may thus be partly due to another trait of
personality. Thus, we conducted a multiple regression analysis
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FIGURE 2 | Performance in the production task as function of the duration and the SOA.
TABLE 1 | Relationship between mindfulness and impulsivity.
FFMQ Observing FFMQ Describing FFMQ Acting with awareness FFMQ Non-reactivity FFMQ Non-judgment FFMQ Total
BIS non-planning −0.01 −0.19∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.16 −0.12 −0.28∗∗∗
BIS Motor 0.04 0.16 −0.23∗∗∗ 0.03 0.06 0.01
BIS Cognitive 0.08 −0.23∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.41∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗
BIS Total 0.05 −0.12 −0.45∗∗∗ −0.07 −0.19∗ −0.31∗∗∗
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗FDR corrected FFMQ, Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire; BIS, Barratt Impulsiveness Scale.
TABLE 2 | Relationship between mindfulness and rumination.
FFMQ Observing FFMQ Describing FFMQ Acting with awareness FFMQ Non-reactivity FFMQ Non-judgment FFMQ Total
RRS brooding 0.21∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.25∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗
RRS reflection 0.37∗∗∗ 0.14 −0.20∗∗∗ −0.09 −0.21∗∗∗ 0.03
RRS total 0.34∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.40∗∗∗ −0.19∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗FDR corrected; RRS, Ruminative Responses Scale; FFMQ, Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire.
TABLE 3 | Relationship between mindfulness and mood.
FFMQ Observing FFMQ Describing FFMQ Acting with awareness FFMQ Non-reactivity FFMQ Non-judgment FFMQ Total
BDI-sf 0.07 −0.21∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.14 −0.52∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗FDR corrected; FFMQ, Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory – short form.
to distinguish between the contribution of all evaluated aspects
of personality and mood on timing performance. In the
introduction, we suggested that specific facets of the personality
dimensions assessed could be more specifically related to time
perception than others. Because of this, all the personality
subscales were entered into the model. Eleven predictors – all the
subscales from four questionnaires, the FFMQ, the RRS, the BDI,
and the BIS –, were simultaneously entered into the model: (i) 5
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FFMQ subscores, (ii) 2 RRS subscores, (iii) BDI total score, and
(iv) 3 BIS subscores.
Verbal Estimation
In the 4-s SOA conditions of the verbal estimation tasks, only
the FFMQ subscales ‘acting with awareness’ and ‘observing’
were significant predictors of performance respectively in the
32-s (β = 0.25, p = 0.031) and 128-s (β = 0.25, p = 0.018)
duration conditions (cf. Table 4; see the Supplementary
Material for all data). Regardless of the duration condition,
only when the SOA is relatively short (4-s) elevated levels
of specific facets of mindfulness were associated with an
overestimation of durations. In the 16-s SOA conditions of the
verbal estimation tasks, there were no significant predictors of
performance.
Judgment of the Passage of Time
Significant predictors of performance in the judgment of the
passage of time were only found in the 4-s SOA conditions. The
‘reflection’ subscale of the RRS was a significant predictor of
performance in the 32-s condition (β = 0.24, p = 0.049). (cf.
Table 5). An increased tendency to display an adaptive form
of rumination was associated with the feeling that time passed
slowly during the 32-s duration condition. On the other hand, the
‘acting with awareness’ subscale of the FFMQ was a significant
predictor of performance in the 128-s duration conditions of
this task (β = −0.25, p = 0.046) (cf. Table 5). Elevated levels
of a specific facet of mindfulness (i.e., ‘acting with awareness’)
were associated with an increased feeling that the time passed
fast during the 128-s duration condition. In contrast, in the
16-s SOA conditions there were no significant predictors of
performance.
Production Tasks
In the 4-s SOA conditions of this task, only the FFMQ ‘describing’
subscale was a significant predictor of performance when subjects
had to produce an interval of 30 s (β = −0.28, p = 0.011;
cf. Table 6). Therefore, elevated levels of this specific facet of
mindfulness were associated with a relative underproduction
(i.e., overestimation) of duration. In the 16-s SOA conditions,
only the RRS ‘reflection subscale’ was a significant predictor
of performance in the 30-s condition of this task (β = 0.23,
p = 0.048; cf. Table 7). An increased tendency to display this
adaptive form of rumination was associated with a relative
overproduction (i.e., underestimation) of duration.
DISCUSSION
The study results suggest that duration perception and the
feeling of the passage of time are influenced both by external
events and by personality traits. Overall, there was no effect
of the length of the empty interval (4-s vs. 16-s) on verbal
TABLE 4 | Multiple linear regression analysis between verbal estimation (4-s SOA conditions) and significant psychological dimensions.
Estimation 32-s (4-s SOA)∗ Estimation 128-s (4-s SOA)∗∗
B β t p B β t P
FFMQ Observing 0.07 0.02 1.83 0.07 3.24 0.25 2.40 0.02
FFMQ acting with awareness 1.00 0.25 2.19 0.03 1.60 0.10 0.86 0.39
B, regression coefficient; β, standardized regression coefficient; FFMQ, Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire. ∗1R2 = 0.172, adjusted R2 = 0.085, F(11,105) = 1.981,
p = 0.037. ∗∗1R2 = 0.142, adjusted R2 = 0.052, F(11,105) = 1.583, p = 0.114. Significant values in bold.
TABLE 5 | Multiple linear regression analysis between judgment of the passage of time (4-s SOA conditions) and significant psychological dimensions.
Judgment of the passage of
time 32-s (4-s SOA)∗
Judgment of the passage of
time 128-s (4-s SOA)∗∗
B β t p B β t P
FFMQ acting with awareness −0.05 −0.17 −1.44 0.15 −0.08 −0.247 −2.02 0.046
RRS Reflection 0.11 0.24 1.98 0.049 0.03 0.06 0.51 0.61
B, regression coefficient; β, standardized regression coefficient; FFMQ = Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire; RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale. ∗1R2 = 0.088,
adjusted R2 = −, F(11,105) = 0.917, p = 0.527. ∗∗1R2 = 0.051, adjusted R2 = −, F(11,105) = 0.514, p = 0.890. Significant values in bold.
TABLE 6 | Multiple linear regression analysis between production tasks (4-s SOA conditions) and significant psychological dimensions.
Production 30-s (4-s SOA)∗ Production 60-s (4-s SOA)∗∗
B β t p B β t P
FFMQ Describing −0.68 −0.28 −2.58 0.01 −0.45 −0.10 −0.87 0.38
B, regression coefficient; β, standardized regression coefficient; FFMQ, Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire. ∗1R2 = 0.156, adjusted R2 = 0.067, F(11,105) = 1.765,
p = 0.0695. ∗∗1 R2 = 0.059, adjusted R2 = –, F(11,105) = 0.599, p = 0.826. Significant values in bold.
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TABLE 7 | Multiple linear regression analysis between production tasks (16-s SOA conditions) and significant psychological dimensions.
Production 30-s (16-s SOA)∗ Production 60-s (16-s SOA)∗∗
B β t P B β t P
RRS Reflection 0.88 0.23 2.00 0.048 −0.001 −0.00 −0.00 0.99
B, regression coefficient; β, standardized regression coefficient; RRS, Ruminative Responses Scale. ∗1R2 = 0.140, adjusted R2 = 0.050, F(11,105) = 1.554, p = 0.123.
∗∗1R2 = 0.107, adjusted R2 = 0.013, F(11,105) = 1.143, p = 0.336. Significant values in bold.
estimates of duration, but long empty intervals (16-s) led to
a relative overproduction (i.e., underestimation) of durations.
In addition, compared to short empty intervals (4-s), long
empty intervals (16-s) were associated with a slowing of the
feeling of the passage of time. Thus, we found a dissociation
between passage of time and duration judgments: the feeling that
time passes slowly is associated with estimations that durations
are shorter than they are. Regarding personality dimensions, a
dissociation between passage of time and duration judgments
was also found: when empty intervals were short (4-s) increased
levels of self-reported mindfulness were associated with both an
overestimation of durations, and with a feeling that the time
passes fast.
The results concerning the effects of different SOAs in the
time perception tasks suggest that judgments of the passage
of time were based on the feeling of boredom rather than
on duration estimates per se. This assumption is crucial to
interpret the whole pattern of results, and we will develop it
first. Subjects knew in advance that they would have to estimate
durations (prospective judgments), and we thus expected that
more attention to duration itself would lead to lengthened
duration estimates, i.e., overestimation and underproduction
(Zakay and Block, 2004). Had this been the case, a high number
of events, i.e., with 4-s SOAs, should have distracted subjects
from time. In contrast, when empty intervals were long, attention
should have been more easily diverted from the secondary
ongoing task (reading numbers aloud) and be more focused
on time itself, which should have led to an even stronger
overestimation of durations. Hence durations should have been
judged as being longer for long empty intervals (16-s SOAs)
than for short empty intervals (4-s SOAs). This was not the
case, however. Regarding duration estimation, there was no
main effect of the SOA. Moreover, in the production tasks,
long empty intervals led to an amplified overproduction, i.e.,
underestimation of durations. Hence, longer empty intervals of
16-s do not lead subjects to attend more to time, and, as a
consequence, to lengthened duration estimates. In addition, the
passage of time did not systematically co-vary with duration
perception. There was only one case in which it did: Long
duration conditions (128-s) were associated with a relative
slowing of the passage of time compared to short ones (32-s).
This suggests that subjects feel that time passes more slowly
when actual durations are indeed longer. This could have
been interpreted as a conflation of passage of time judgments
with duration judgments. However, within the same duration
conditions, subjects felt that the time passed faster when empty
intervals were short (4-s) compared to when they were long
(16-s), although duration estimates did not differ between the
two conditions. If passage of time judgments had reflected
duration perception per se, then a shortening of duration
estimates should have been associated with a feeling that time
passes fast (and conversely). Long empty intervals led to an
overproduction, which, according to the standard cognitive
pacemaker-accumulator model, corresponds to a shortening of
duration estimates (Zakay and Block, 2004; Droit-Volet and
Meck, 2007; Wearden et al., 2014). This relative shortening of
duration should thus have been associated with a feeling that
time passes faster. However, the results showed the reverse.
Long empty intervals led to an overproduction (underestimation)
of durations, but also to a feeling that time passes slowly.
Similar dissociations between the subjective passage of time and
duration estimation judgments were observed when considering
psychological dimensions. Compared to other psychological
dimensions, mindfulness was the main predictor of performance
on duration estimation and the passage of time judgments
for short (4-s SOA) empty intervals. However, high levels of
mindfulness were associated with both a greater overestimation
of duration, and with a faster passage of time. That is,
we show a dissociation between duration estimation and the
judgment of passage of time, as more mindful individuals in
one condition relatively overestimated duration but also felt
that the time passed faster. Again, if the evaluation of the
passage of time had been directly related to duration estimation,
overestimation of durations should have led to the feeling that
time passed slowly, whereas we observed the reverse relation.
This means that the judgment of the subjective passage of
time reflects something different than duration estimation.
Our results do not seem to be easily explained by boredom
either.
Past studies have reported a relationship between boredom
and a slowing of the passage of time (Watt, 1991; Wittmann
and Paulus, 2008; Wearden et al., 2014). As suggested by Zakay
(2014), boredom may not only induce the feeling that time
passes slowly, but may also increase the attentional resources
allocated to time. Indeed, in a boring situation, subjects would
look forward to the end of the boring period, and thus would
attend more to time, leading to a lengthening of duration
estimation. If the 16-s empty interval is experienced as unusually
long, it should lead subjects to both an underproduction, i.e.,
a lengthening of duration perception, and the feeling that time
passes more slowly. As underlined above, this was not observed.
Even if long (16-s) intervals were associated with a slowing
of the passage of time, they did not lead subjects to attend
more to time and, as a consequence, to an overestimation of
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durations. Wearden (2015) suggested recently that the feeling of
the passage of time and duration estimation are two independent
dimensions, and our results are consistent with this proposal.
The duration of the tasks as a whole was rather short (i.e., up
to 128-s for verbal estimation and 60-s for production tasks),
and subjects may not have felt bored enough to attend more
to time when empty intervals were long (16-s) compared to
when they were short (4-s). However, the structure of our
experiment may suggest yet another possibility. According to
the model of Zakay and Block (2004), attention is allocated
to either time or the task at hand, but not to both. This is
particularly well adapted to everyday life, when a stimulating
task possibly captures all one’s attention, leading subjects to ‘lose
track of time.’ However, in the case of empty intervals, it is
extremely difficult to control the kind of internal information
processing that subjects might engage themselves in Zakay
(1993). In non-stimulating situations, they could either attend
to time (e.g., because they are bored), or mind-wander. It is
perfectly possible that the regular interruption of empty intervals
by the presentation of numbers prevented subjects from mind-
wandering. This would not have been the case for 16-s intervals
though, because they were exceptionally long. Hence, if mind-
wandering was more frequent during long empty intervals, it
might have paradoxically distracted subjects from attending to
time, contrary to our initial predictions. If, at all, 4-s intervals
may have produced a non-specific alerting effect, which might
have helped subjects to be more attentive both to temporal
and non-temporal events, thus leading to less overproduction
when empty intervals were short (4-sec SOAs). An explanation
in terms of alertness is consistent with results reported by
Treisman (1963) and Wearden (2008), and recent studies by
Wearden et al. (2014) and Droit-Volet and Wearden (2015).
These authors suggest that increased arousal, which might also
be translated as increased alertness, may be associated to both
a lengthening of durations, and to a faster passage of time, as
observed in the present study. Such a non-specific attentional
effect might also explain the results regarding dispositional
mindfulness.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to partial out the
specific contributions of dispositional mindfulness on judgments
of multiple-seconds intervals. Before developing this point,
it is important to note that our evaluation of personality
traits is consistent with the literature. We found a significant
negative relationship between (i) dispositional mindfulness and
impulsivity (e.g., Wittmann et al., 2014), (ii) mindfulness and
rumination (e.g., Paul et al., 2013; Marchetti et al., 2014; Crawley,
2015), and (iii) mindfulness and current depressive symptoms
(e.g., Shorey et al., 2014). The replication of results found in
earlier studies suggests that self-report measures are reliable, and
that these psychological dimensions are strongly related to each
other. However, when all of them were taken into account, only
dispositional mindfulness and reflection-rumination significantly
predicted performance on both duration estimation and passage
of time judgments. Indeed, in our study, mindfulness was
associated with a greater overestimation of duration and a faster
passage of time, and the opposite was found for reflection-
rumination. Regarding passage of time judgments, as mentioned
before, long empty intervals led to a feeling that time passed
more slowly, whereas there was no effect of the length of the
empty interval on verbal estimates of duration. When personality
dimensions were taken into account, only when empty intervals
were short (4-s SOA) did mindfulness and trait reflection-
rumination predict performance on the feeling of the passage
of time. This suggests that, regardless of personality traits, when
empty intervals are long (16-s SOA), subjects as a whole feel
that time passes more slowly. This might be akin to a ceiling
effect, where 16-s intervals are too long to distinguish more
mindful from less mindful individuals. In contrast, when empty
intervals are short, personality traits such as mindfulness and
trait reflection-rumination predict, in a distinctive manner, the
way subjects feel that the time has passed – either fast or slow,
respectively.
Since high levels of mindfulness were related to a relative
speeding of the passage of time, this suggests that highly
mindful subjects were rather less bored and more attentive
to the secondary ongoing task, whereas the opposite would
hold true for individuals with higher values in trait reflection-
rumination, who were probably more bored and reported a
slowing of the passage of time. The fact that more mindful
subjects are more attentive to the ongoing task is consistent with
previous studies showing improved performance on attention
tasks in these subjects (e.g., Ainsworth et al., 2013). Also,
consistent with this interpretation, it is interesting to note that
‘acting with awareness’ was the only mindfulness subscale which
predicted performance on passage of time judgments in our
study. This indicates that those individuals, who are more able
to allocate attention to present non-temporal events, are those
who feel that the time passes faster. In addition, being more
mindful during the time perception task itself leads to longer
duration estimates, as found in our study. As suggested above,
this might be explained by a non-specific effect of attention.
If mindful subjects are particularly attentive to present events,
and if these events have a non-specific arousal effect, then
these attention mechanisms would explain why highly mindful
subjects overestimate durations, on the one hand, and feel that
time passes faster, on the other hand. These results nevertheless
should be interpreted with caution, since a high number of
psychological dimensions were entered in our regression model,
and only a few facets of mindfulness and rumination seemed
to be related to time perception. Although we checked for
multiple comparisons, it is difficult to exclude the possibility of
false positives, and it is also possible that some relationships
were overlooked due to the alpha adjustment for multiple
testing.
There are a few limitations to this study. First of all, the
majority of our sample comprised young students, which raises
the question of the generalizability of our findings. Future studies
should include more individuals in other age groups, since time
perception abilities may change during the life-span (Ulbrich
et al., 2007; Wearden, 2015). Second, the concept of mindfulness
is derived from eastern Buddhist tradition, and whether self-
report questionnaires are able to evaluate the psychological
mechanisms involved in this concept is still a matter of debate
(Grossman, 2011). Third, the design of our study makes it difficult
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to determine how individuals responded to empty intervals, and
whether they felt bored during the task. Thus, boredom – as a
personality trait and as a state related to the task – should be
assessed directly in future studies. In addition, the mechanisms
involved in passage of time judgments are still hypothetical, and
deserve to be explored in a more thorough manner. Finally, the
relationship between time perception and other psychological
dimensions, such as the tendency to self-reflect or mind-wander,
should be addressed in a more in-depth manner in future
studies.
All in all, our results are nonetheless in line with findings
reported by Wittmann et al. (2014) who suggested that, as
a personality trait, mindfulness is associated with duration
estimation. They are also consistent with results in experienced
mindfulness meditators, since several studies have shown that
meditators relatively overestimate durations in the milliseconds
to seconds and also minutes range (Kramer et al., 2013; Sucala
and David, 2013; Droit-Volet et al., 2015). Moreover, our findings
add to those showing dissociation between duration judgments
and the feeling of the passage of time (Wearden et al., 2014;
Wearden, 2015).
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